绿色智慧交通

网约车合乘均衡匹配与激励策略

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  • 1.北京交通大学 交通运输学院,北京 100044
    2.北京交通大学 计算机与信息技术学院,北京 100044
彭子烜(1991-),女,博士,讲师,主要从事双边稳定匹配等研究。E-mail:pengzixuan@bjtu.edu.cn

收稿日期: 2023-03-30

  网络出版日期: 2023-06-20

基金资助

国家自然科学基金青年科学基金资助项目(72101016);国家自然科学基金委-中国国家铁路集团有限公司高铁联合基金资助项目(U2034208);北京交通大学人才基金资助项目(2023JBRC010)

Taxi-Sharing Matching Equilibrium Under Peer-Passenger Incentive Mechanism

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  • 1.School of Traffic and Transportation,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China
    2.School of Computer and Information Technology,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China
彭子烜(1991-),女,博士,讲师,主要从事双边稳定匹配等研究。E-mail:pengzixuan@bjtu.edu.cn

Received date: 2023-03-30

  Online published: 2023-06-20

Supported by

the Young Scientists Fund of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72101016);the National Natural Science Foundation of China-China National Railway Group Corporation High Speed Railway Basic Research Joint Fund(U2034208)

摘要

针对需求高峰期乘客以红包或调度费等形式激励网约车司机以实现网约车自我调度这一问题,研究了乘客-网约车匹配决策与激励策略选择间的交互关系。基于网约车合乘模式下的均衡匹配状态,以乘客总剩余最大化为目标,考虑匹配、均衡、成本等约束条件,构建了考虑奖励策略的乘客-网约车均衡匹配模型,从乘客视角设计了乘客激励策略、网约车激励策略、乘客和网约车激励策略,并将3种激励策略嵌入到列生成算法对模型进行求解,以实现匹配均衡和价格均衡。以大连市出租车数据为对象进行实证分析,研究结果表明,相比于仅以随机调度费等形式从供给侧激励司机,同时从需求侧和供给侧实施激励策略可以促成更多合乘出行,乘客剩余可提高12.6%;当需求大于供给时,26%的激励在乘客间转移以实现更多的合乘出行;合乘折扣系数也会影响激励流向,同时使用激励策略和合乘折扣策略调节供需可以避免司机恶意竞争和乘客无效激励,在降低乘客出行成本的同时提高司机收益,促成更多合乘出行。

本文引用格式

彭子烜, 崔林, 郭志伟, 等 . 网约车合乘均衡匹配与激励策略[J]. 华南理工大学学报(自然科学版), 2024 , 52(2) : 95 -103 . DOI: 10.12141/j.issn.1000-565X.230158

Abstract

In view of the problem that passengers motivate ride-hailing drivers in the form of red packet or dispatching fees to realize self-scheduling, this paper studied the interactive relationship between passenger-ride-hailing matching decision and incentive strategy choice. Based on the matching equilibrium in taxi-sharing, this paper designed a matching equilibrium model for taxi-sharing with peer-passenger incentive mechanism, taking the maximization of total passenger surplus as the goal and considering the constraints such as matching, equilibrium and cost. From the perspective of passengers, it designed the passenger incentive strategy, ride-hailing incentive strategy, passenger and ride-hailing incentive strategy, and the three incentive strategies were embedded into the column generation algorithm to solve the model and to achieve matching equilibrium and pricing equilibrium. By empirical analysis of Dalian taxi data, the results show that, compared with with only motivating drivers from the supply side in the form of random dispatching fees, the implementation of incentive strategies from the demand side and the supply side can promote taxi-share, and the passenger surplus can be increased by 12.6%. When the demand is larger than the supply, about 26% of incentive is transferred among peer passengers for more taxi-share matches. The fare discount rate also affects the flow of incentives. Using incentive strategies and discount strategies simultaneously can avoid malicious competition and ineffective incentives. By increasing the number of taxi-sharing trips, we can simultaneously reduce travel costs for passengers and boost driver incomes.

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