收稿日期: 2012-04-25
修回日期: 2012-08-03
网络出版日期: 2012-12-03
基金资助
广东省自然科学基金团队项目(9351064101000003);广东省高等学校珠江学者岗位计划资助项目(2011);广东省高等学校高层次人才项目(2012);广州市科技计划项目(2011J4300028)
Formal Analysis and Verification of Security for AutomatedTrust Negotiation
Received date: 2012-04-25
Revised date: 2012-08-03
Online published: 2012-12-03
Supported by
广东省自然科学基金团队项目(9351064101000003);广东省高等学校珠江学者岗位计划资助项目(2011);广东省高等学校高层次人才项目(2012);广州市科技计划项目(2011J4300028)
刘欣欣 唐韶华 . 自动信任协商安全性的形式化分析与验证[J]. 华南理工大学学报(自然科学版), 2013 , 41(1) : 77 -82,94 . DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-565X.2013.01.012
In order to implement the formal analysis and verification of the security for automated trust negotiation(ATN), this paper takes the formal analysis methods of security protocols as references and proposes a novel ap-proach to ATN modeling and security verification with the help of the process algebra applied π calculus. In this ap-proach, ATN is formalized as the parallel composition of two processes corresponding to two negotiators, and theprocess of a negotiator is the static modeling of its certificates and authorization policies. The ATN security is de-fined as the observational equivalence of the applied π calculus so as to verify not only the security of the authorizationpolicy enforcement but also the privacy of negotiators. With the help of the automatic protocol analyzer ProVerif,the security of ATN is automatically analyzed. Experimental results show that the proposed approach helps to imple-ment automatic security verification with high feasibility and efficiency.
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